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A RIVER RUNS THROUGH IT: WHAT STATES ALONG THE MISSOURI
RIVER CAN LEARN ABOUT WATER ALLOCATION FROM CONFLICT IN THE
ACF RIVER BASIN
Se. Fed Power Customers, Inc. v. Geren'
I. INTRODUCTION
The Missouri River -- flowing over 2,600 miles from its source in
Montana to its mouth in St. LouiS2 and draining over 500,000 square miles
of land in ten states and providences of Canada 3 -- is at the center of a
dispute between its basin states. Recent droughts and the discovery of
threatened species have pitted upper basin states against those in the lower
basin as they compete for increased water amounts. Recreational
activities in the upper basin, requiring increased reservoir levels, have
come at a cost to lower basin states more concerned with navigation and
flood control. Despite years of negotiation attempts and lengthy litigation,
these states have yet to reach an arrangement that meets the needs of the
upper and lower basin.
Comparatively, states in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint
River basin (hereinafter "ACF Basin") fight over proper water allocation
as well. This area, which begins with the Chattahoochee River in northern
Georgia, flows south to mark the Georgia-Alabama border, confluences
with the 349-mile long Flint River5 and then flows south to join with the
' Se. Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v. Geren, 514 F.3d 1316 (D.C. Cir. 2008).2 Northwestern Div., U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, Summary: Missouri River: Final
Environmental Impact Statement: Master Water Control Manual and Update 6 (Mar.
2004), http://www.nwd.usace.army.mil/pa/report/summary.pdf.
3 Norman W. Thorson, Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don't-Reflections on John
Ferrell's Big Dam Era, 2 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 13, 16 (1997).
4 Georgia, Florida, and Alabama compromise the ACF River Basin. U.S. Geological
Survey, Description of the ACF River Basin Study Area,
http://ga.water.usgs.gov/nawqa/basinall.html (last visited Sep. 29, 2008).
5 Barlow Burke, Commentary, Association ofAmerican Law Schools Conference:
Transcript of the Section on Natural Resources in Atlanta, Georgia, January 5, 2004, 21
GA. ST. U. L. REv. 245, 247. (2004).
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Apalachicola River,6 contributes to the Apalachicola Bay with flourishing
shrimp, crab, and oyster industries.7 Like the Missouri River Basin, recent
drought reduced water flow and caused states at opposite ends of the
system to compete to maintain their respective existing water levels. At
the northern end of the basin, Georgia uses a significant amount of water
to provide for the ever-growing metropolitan Atlanta area9 while at the
southern end, the Apalachicola Bay's oyster population requires a high
level of water to survive.
Costly litigation and failed negotiations in the ACF Basin serve as
harsh reminders that states in the Missouri River Basin have yet to reach
an agreement concerning its water allocation. In its recent decision,
Southeastern Federal Power Customers, Inc. v. Gerenjo the D.C. Court
of Appeals demonstrates the difficulties of water allocation among the
three states of the ACF Basin. This note will use Southeastern and its
events to explore the potential consequences of litigation-based
management of the Missouri River and to consider new options for an
intrastate agreement. If the states are ever to reach an agreement that
provides stability for long-term planning, the agreement must retain a high
degree of flexibility in water allocation that allows the Corps discretion in
considering the immediate interests of states in both the upper and lower
Missouri River Basin.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1946, the United States Congress authorized the construction of
the Buford Dam on the Chattahoochee River creating a federally owned
and operated reservoir named Lake Sidney Lanier." South of the Buford
Dam is the ACF Basin that flows to Alabama.12 Water from Lake Lanier




9 Id. at 246-47.
10 Se. Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v. Geren, 514 F.3d 1316 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
" Id. at 1318.
12 id.
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Lake Lanier was specifically authorized for navigational purposes,
hydropower generation, and flood control; water supply was considered an
incidental benefit.13 Despite its classification in the 1970's, the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (hereinafter "Corps") began entering into five-year
renewable contracts allowing for the storage and withdrawal of local
drinking water from Lake Lanier.14 Prior to the expiration of the last
temporary storage permit, the Corps sent a report to Congress
recommending 207,000 acre-feet of storage in Lake Lanier be reallocated
from hydropower to local consumption.' In response to this, Alabama
sued the Corps to enjoin this reallocation.16
In 1992, Alabama, Florida, and Georgia entered into a joint
agreement with the Corps allowing for continued withdrawals from Lake
Lanier.17 Additionally, in 1997, the same three states and Congress
approved a compact governing water storage allocation, planning, and
dispute resolution in the ACF Basin. The compact expired on August 31,
2003, with no permanent agreement on the allocation of water storage.' 8
Prior to the compact's expiration, Southeastern Federal Powers
Customers, Inc. (hereinafter "Southeastern") sued the Corps alleging that
it lacked authority to divert water from Lake Lanier to the detriment of
hydropower users. 19 Additionally, Southeastern alleged that increased
withdrawals from Lake Lanier compromised water use for hydropower
and caused economic loss. 2 0 Shortly thereafter, Georgia petitioned the
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works to "formally reallocate
reservoir storage space for local consumption." 21 Georgia's request was
denied because "[the] request involve[d] substantial withdrawals from
Lake Lanier and accommodating it would affect authorized project
13 Id. at 1323.
14 Id. at 1318; see Se. Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v. Harvey, 400 F.3d 1, 2 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
Is Se. Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v. Geren, 514 F.3d 1316, 1318-19 (D.C. Cir. 2008).16 Id. at 1319; see Alabama v. USACE, No. CV90-H-1331-B (N.D. Ala. Sept. 19, 1990)
(litigation resulted in a stay order and no permanent water storage allocation was
undertaken.).
17 Se. Fed Power Customers, Inc., 514 F.3d at 1319.
1 Id. at 1319; see Pub. L. No. 105-104, 111 Stat. 2219 (1997).
19 Se. Fed Power Customers, Inc., 514 F.3d at 1319.20 d
21 Id.
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Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv., Vol. 16, No. 1
purposes. [I]t cannot be accommodated without additional Congressional
authorization." 2 2
The D.C. District Court compelled Southeastern and the Corps to
mediation, where they were joined by Georgia and a group of water
supply providers (hereinafter "Providers").23 The parties came to an
agreement (hereinafter "Agreement") in January 2003, but it remains the
source of contention for the parties in this case. 24 The Agreement stated
that the Corps would allocate between 210,858 and 240,858 acre-feet of
Lake Lanier's 1,049,400 acre-feet for local water usage for 10 to 20
years.25 Further, the Agreement provided that the allocation become
permanent only if the Corps recommends that Congress "formally make
the storage covered by the Interim Contacts available on a permanent
basis."26 Such recommendations must receive Congressional approval or a
judgment holding Congressional approval unnecessary; whichever comes
first.27 The Agreement further provided compensation to generators of
hydropower in the form of hydropower rates credit for lost opportunities
resulting from increased water storage.28
In October 2003, the D.C. District Court allowed Alabama and
Florida to intervene in the suit between Southeastern and the Corps.
Additionally, Alabama and Florida reinstated Alabama's original lawsuit
against the Corps from 1990 that was filed in response to the Corps' 1989
recommendation to Congress to reallocate Lake Lanier storage space.29
The Alabama District Court entered a preliminary injunction preventing
the implementation of the Agreement. 30
In the D.C. District Court, Alabama and Florida argued the
Agreement exceeded the authority conferred on the Corps by Congress,





26 Id. at 1320 (internal quotes omitted).
27 d28 d
29 d
30 Id.; see Alabama v. USA CE supra note 2.
3 43 U.S.C. § 390b(d) (2000).
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Flood Control Act 32 (hereinafter "FCA" , and the National Environmental
Protection Act (hereinafter "NEPA"). 4 The District Court rejected the
arguments of Alabama and Florida, and approved the Agreement
contingent upon the "dissolution of the [Alabama District Court's]
injunction.35  Further, the District Court concluded that while the
Agreement would affect hydropower generation-- an original purpose of
Lake Lanier--assent by dropower generators indicated Congressional
approval was not needed.
Upon dissolution of the Alabama District Court's injunction,
Alabama and Florida appealed the D.C. District Court decision, again
arguing that the Agreement requires Congressional approval under the
WSA because it both "constitutes a major operational change and
seriously affects project purposes."3 7  The states argued further that the
Agreement violated the FCA3 8 and the NEPA 39 . The D.C. Court of
Appeals focused on the alleged violation of the WSA, which states in part
that the "Corps must obtain prior approval before undertaking 'major ...
operational changes."' 40 The Court held the reallocation of Lake Lanier's
storage space represented a major operational change without
Congressional authorization and therefore reversed the District Court's
approval of the Agreement.4'
32 3 U.S.C. § 708 (2000).
42 U.S.C. § 4321 et. seq. (2000).




38Id (arguing violation of FCA because it allows only a temporary sale of water whereas
the Agreement is a long-term transaction involving non-surplus water).
Id. (arguing violation of NEPA by "irrevocably committing[ing] [the Corps] to
executing the [Agreement] at the completion of its NEPA analysis, effectively bypassing
the statute").
4 0 Id at 1318 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 390b(d) ("Modifications of a reservoir project
heretofore [before July 3, 1958] authorized, surveyed, planned, or constructed to include
storage as provided in subsection (b), which would seriously affect the purposes for
which the project was authorized, surveyed, planned, or constructed, or which would
involve major structural or operational changes shall be made only upon the approval of
Congress as now [on July 3, 1958] provided by law")).
41 Id. at 1318.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Methods for Solving Interstate Allocation Problems
Conflicts of interstate water allocation can arise between individuals in
states or between the states themselves.42 The major methods of handling
interstate water allocation conflicts include: (1) voluntary cooperation; (2)
private suits between water users in different states; (3) equitable
apportionment suits between states; (4) interstate water apportionment
compacts; and (5) Congressional apportionment.43  Each method for
handling interstate water allocation conflicts will be examined in turn.
1. Voluntary Cooperation
Voluntary cooperation agreements use cooperative action bZ the states
to reach a voluntary or binding agreement for water allocation. A prime
example of voluntary cooperation is an agreement reached in 1985
between the eight Great Lakes states. 45 Each state followed the provisions
of the voluntary agreement until 2001, when the governors of the states
and Canadian officials moved to a binding agreement.46  Voluntary
cooperation is rarely employed now as these agreements are extremely
fragile and raise Constitutional concerns because they are not subject to
Congressional approval.47
2. Private Suit
Private suits between water users in different states are normally
between individual downstream users that assert claims against an
42 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 43-1 (Robert E. Beck ed., 2004).
43 Id. at 43-2.
4 id.
45 Id. at 43-3.
46 Id. at 43-4.
47 d
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upstream user from a different state for interfering with water supply. 48
Early suits dealt with small streams that were often too small to maintain
an adequate water supply. 49  As concerns about the adequacy of larger
streams grew, states took a direct interest in interstate water allocation on
behalf of their citizens.50 As a result, private suits between interstate water
users declined and now have sporadic use at best. '
3. Equitable Apportionment Suit between States
The essential feature of an equitable apportionment suit is the equal
dignity shared by the sovereign states in the federal judicial system.52 The
United States Supreme Court maintains exclusive jurisdiction and applies
federal common law, rather than applicable state law.53  Equitable
apportionment has been strongly criticized-- most notably by the United
States Supreme Court, which urges states to resolve their disputes via
compacts under expert advisement rather than employ an inflexible rule
mandated by the Court. 54  The doctrine of equitable apportionment
continues to play a strong role in interstate disputes since the threat of
litigation induces upstream states-- which have greater control on stream
flow-- to negotiate compacts with downstream states.5 5
4. Interstate Compact
An apportionment compact relies on "trading compromise of
conflicting claims" 56 and does not require the judicial or quasi-judicial
48 Id. at 44-1 (Robert E. Beck, ed., 2004); see e.g. Howell v. Johnson et al., 89 F. 556
(C.C.D. Mont. 1898); see also Conant et al., v. Deep Creek & Curlew Valley Irrig. Co. et
al., 66 P. 188 (1901); see also Willey et al., v. Decker et al, 73 P. 210 (1903).
49 ANDERSON, ET AL., supra note 42, at 44-1.
s0 Id. at 44-1,44-2.
" Id. at 44-2.
52 Id. at 45-1.
s Id. at 45-1, 45-2. The federal Constitution gives the Supreme Court original
jurisdiction of all suits in which a state is a party. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
54 ANDERSON, ET AL., supra note 42, at 45-7.
s Id. at 45-7.
sId. at 46-1 (citing Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S.
92, 104 (1938)).
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process; however, the Compact Clause of the U.S. Constitution requires
Congressional approval of all agreements allocating interstate water.57
Proponents of interstate compacts argue their superiority to litigation since
compacts enable "sensible compromise, not following strictly legal
lines,"58  and allow for continued administration necessary to
accommodate changed conditions.59 Formation of a water apportionment
compact traditionally occurs in five steps, beginning with Congressional
authorization to negotiate a compact.60 Next, the interested states appoint
commissioners that negotiate the compact. If the states reach an
agreement, the Governor and Legislature of each state approve the
compact. Finally, Congress enacts legislation approving the compact. 62
While agreements vary on the formulas used to calculate water allocation,
compacts traditionally control water apportionment in one of two ways:
(a) limit the amount of water used by the upstream state or (b) guarantee
the downstream state a. certain amount of water. 63
5. Congressional Apportionment
Apportionment by Congress can be used to solve interstate allocation
problems, although not often employed.64 Commentators speculate the
reason Congress rarely invokes its apportionment powers is twofold.65
First, Congress was late to recognize a Constitutional power to apportion
interstate waters until the 1963 United States Supreme Court decision of
Arizona v. California.66 Second, states are reluctant to seek congressional
57 id
ss Id. at 46-4 (citing Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the
Constitution-A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685 (1925)).
59 Id.
6o Id. at 46-7.
61 Id.
62 Id.
6 Id. at 46-10.
6 Id. at 47-2.
65 Id. at 47-10.
66Id. at 47-2 (citing Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (holding "[w]here
Congress has so exercised its constitutional power over waters, courts have no power to
substitute their own notions of an 'equitable apportionment' for the apportionment
chosen by Congress.")).
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apportionment, and Congress is hesitant to implement its apportionment
power, unless specifically requested by the affected states.
B. Water Allocation in the Missouri River Basin
Issues of water allocation with the Missouri River have a long history
and are rooted in socio-economic and free market realities. Seeking relief
from high railroad shipping costs, early modifications to the Missouri
River were designed to enhance navigation.68 In 1910, Congress
appropriated money to establish a six-foot-deep navigational channel
between Kansas City, Missouri and the river's juncture with the
Mississippi River.69 In 1927, Congress further allocated funds to extend
the navigational channel upstream to Sioux City, Iowa.70 In 1933,
President Franklin Roosevelt authorized the construction of a dam across
the Missouri River in eastern Montana to increase the number of jobs
during the Great Depression. 7' The project, later known as the Fort Peck
Project, ultimately promoted navigation and provided flood control. 72 The
project foreshadowed years of dispute over the purpose of the newly
created reservoir as upper basin residents expected to use the reservoir for
irrigation while lower basin residents expected to use the reservoir for
navigation and flood control.
By the 1940's, changes in channelization contributed to severe
flooding in the Missouri River Basin, resulting in lives lost and millions of
dollars of property damage.74 As a result, Congress conducted special
hearings and passed a resolution urging the Corps to assess the need for
67 Id. at 47-10.
68 Craig A. Street, Addressing Missouri's Domestic Conflict ofInterests in the Missouri
River: A Suggested Approachfor Resolution, 5 Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 117, 121
(1998).69 d701d. at 122.
71 Id
721 Id. at 123.
7 Tim Garrison, What does a Pallid Sturgeon Say When It Runs into a Cement Wall?
"Dam!" the Interminable Revision of the Missouri River Master Manual, 10 MO. ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y REv. 61, 62 (2003).
74 Street, supra note 68, at 123; see generally Henry C. Hart, THE DARK MISSOURI (Univ.
of Wis. Press) (1957).
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flood control on the Missouri River.75 The Corps assigned Colonel Pick
who developed a plan-- now known as the 'Pick Plan'-- that called for
levees at varying points along the river and a deeper, wider navigational
channel. 76  Although the Pick Plan was primarily implemented for
navigation and flood control, it included multiple benefits, such as
irrigation, hydroelectric power, and recreation, to ensure congressional
approval and financial support.
Almost concurrently with the Pick Plan, U.S. Department of Interior's
Bureau of Reclamation (hereinafter 'Bureau') developed the Sloan Plan,
which focused on irrigation and reclamation interests and called for the
construction of ninety dams and reservoirs throughout the upper basin.7 8
The Sloan Plan emphasized the benefit of hydroelectric power, justifyin
its expense through the sale of hydroelectric power and irrigation water.
Both plans were presented to Congress and resulted in deadlock.80
President Roosevelt indicated his preference for creating an organization
similar to the Tennessee Valley Authority and removal of control from
both the Corps and the Bureau. ' Faced with the prospect of losing total
control, the Corps and Bureau met and developed the Pick-Sloan plan as
part of the Flood Control Act of 1944, which combined the two plans. 82
In later negotiations, the Corps and Bureau agreed that "whichever agency
constructed and subsequently maintained a particular project would retain
primary responsibility for its operation with regard to all uses other than
flood control and irrigation." 83
The Bureau initially postponed the construction of its projects, letting
the Corps develop its main reservoirs first. However, by the time the
Corps had completed its projects and begun operation, there was no
money available for the Bureau's projects.84 Although some of the
75 Garrison, supra note 73, at 62.76 id.
n Id. at 63.
78 Street, supra note 68, at 125.
7 Garrison, supra note 73, at 64.80 id
81 id
82 Id at 65.
83 Street, supra note 68, at 126-27.
M Id. at 127.
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Bureau's projects were eventually built, the Corps, by virtue of its
agreement with the Bureau regarding which agency would construct and
operate different projects, obtained far more operational control over the
river.85 The Corps' authority was solidified by the United States Supreme
Court in its 1988 decision, ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri.
In ETSI, the Court was asked to decide what may be done with surplus
water from the Missouri River reservoirs. Energy Transportation
System, Inc. (hereinafter 'ETSI') intended to purchase excess reservoir
water from South Dakota to operate a coal slurry pipeline transporting
coal outside of the Missouri River Basin. Missouri, Iowa, and Nebraska
filed suit in federal district court to enjoin the sale. The suit alleged the
Secretary of the Interior's proposed sale of reservoir water, without
approval of the Secretary of the Army, went beyond the authority granted
by the Flood Control Act of 1944.89 The Court agreed and granted the
Corps exclusive control of projects over which the Corps assumed primary
responsibility. 90 Unfortunately, resolution of the Corps' authority did
little to ease disputes between the upper and lower basin regarding water
allocation. Following the construction of six reservoirs, the upper basin
benefited greatly from the new-found recreational uses. However, this use
was at odds with the navigational interests of the lower basin.91 Tensions
heightened between 1987 and 1992 when the entire river basin
experienced a drought, thus calling into question the Corps' management
practices.92
To combat this drought, the Corps followed the Missouri River
Main Stem Reservoir System Reservoir Regulation Manual -- more
commonly known as the Master Manual. 93  The Corps, following
established manual priorities, released water to maintain river navigation
85 Id.
86 ETSI Pipeline Project v. Mo., 484 U.S. 495 (1988).
8 Garrison, supra note 73, at 66.
88 Street, supra note 68, at 128.
89 Garrison, supra note 73, at 66.
9 Street, supra note 68, at 129.
9' Id.
92 id.
9 Garrison, supra note 73, at 67.
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in the lower basin.94 The release resulted in low reservoir levels and a
decrease in recreational use in the upper basin, particularly in late
summer. As a result of the outcry from states located in the upper basin
and alleged new developments in the public interest, the Corps began
reevaluating the Master Manual.96 In its reevaluation, the Corps identified
a number of concerns regarding operation of the mainstream system;
specifically flood control, navigation, and recreation in addition to other
issues. 97
C. Missouri's Interests in the Missouri River
The state of Missouri is divided by conflicting interest groups, each
with its own opinion about the management of the Missouri River.98
Missouri has not uniformly adopted any particular position in the interstate
water dispute, but each interest presents a different perspective and a
different set of challenges, specifically in interstate negotiations.99
Primary and influential interests include flood control, navigation, fish,
wildlife, recreation, and domestic and industrial water supply. '
As a lower basin state, Missouri has traditionally been interested in
flood control and navigation.' 0' Despite the numerous floods in the
Missouri River Basin after the construction of upper basin dams, the Corps
estimates approximately $7 billion in damages have been saved by flood-
control measures between 1937 and 1993.102 In addition to this,
construction, maintenance, and operation costs associated with flood-
control projects have been offset by other plan benefits, such as
hydropower electricity and recreation.103 On the other hand, navigational
interests continue arguing over water allocation since requisite minimum
94
95 Id96 id.
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downstream flow is continually threatened by upper basin activities.'0
Downstream navigation also serves the Missouri agricultural community
by providing alternative shipping means for its commodities. 05 As a
result, navigation often receives the most attention from Missouri interest
groups and government officials alike.' 06
Other Missouri interest groups are mindful of increased fish, wildlife,
and recreational uses. They argue the Missouri River should be managed
in a way to encourage environmental and recreational opportunities,
specifically by returning the Missouri River back to its historical flow
pattern.lo7 Returning the river to its historical flow would recreate the
historic "spring pulse" that accompanies spring rain and melting snow and
creates a habitat for fish spawning and feeding. 0 8 Finally, a small number
of groups are concerned with the maintenance of the domestic and
industrial water supply.109 While the Missouri River currently serves as
the main water source for many community water supplies, those
interested in protecting the Missouri River as a source of drinking water
have yet to become involved since there is no immediate threat to current
water supplies."10
D. Water Allocation in Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin
Much like the dispute found between the upper and lower states of the
Missouri River Basin, the ACF River Basin presents two competing
interests that directly affect one another and have proven to be an
impediment to water allocation negotiations.
The ACF River Basin is comprised of the Apalachicola,
Chattahoochee, and Flint Rivers of Alabama, Florida, and Georgia and








11 Christine A. Klein, On Integrity: Some Considerations for Water Law, 56 ALA. L.
REv. 1009, 1052 (2005).
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begins with the Chattahoochee River in the northern mountains of
Georgia, flows south to mark the Georgia-Alabama border and
confluences with the Flint River at that point." 2  The Flint River is over
349 miles long and then flows south to join with Florida's longest river,
the Apalachicola.'1 3  The Apalachicola River then flows into the
Apalachicola Bay.114
The small fishing village of Apalachicola maintains a regional
commercial fishing industry that supplies 90% of Florida's oysters and
10% of the nation's oysters. 5 The village, located on what is often
referred to as Florida's "forgotten coast," has also developed a substantial
tourist industry known for its "slow, old-South atmosphere."" 6 Similar to
threats of flow restriction in the upper Missouri River Basin, these
industries in Apalachicola are at risk for decreased water levels as the
Apalachicola River in 2002 was listed as the eleventh most endangered
river in the country.' 7
Hundreds of miles upstream, Atlanta, Georgia continues to grow
exponentially, placing a strain on local water supply. Between 1970
and 1980, Atlanta's metropolitan population increased by 27% and by
33% between 1980 and 1990.119 The increased population also increased
demand on important resources such as water, usage of which is expected
to increase over 40% by 2050.120 Much like the Apalachicola River, the
Chattahoochee River was named among the country's most endangered
,12 Barlow Burke, Commentary, Association ofAmerican Law Schools Conference:
Transcript of the Section on Natural Resources in Atlanta, Georgia, January 5, 2004, 21
GA. ST. U. L. REv. 245, 247. (2004).
113 id.
1 Id.
16 Id. at 1053.
"' Id. (citing PRWeb, American Rivers, Most Endangered Rivers of2002 Announced,
(Apr 4, 2002), http://www.prweb.com/releases/2004/4/prweb36216.htm).
118 Klein supra, note 111, at 1053.
119 Id.
120 Id. (citing ROBERT GLENNON, WATER FOLLIES, GROUNDWATER PUMPING AND THE
FATE OF AMERICA'S FRESHWATERS 185, 188 (2002) (stating that an increase in projected
municipal and industrial water usage from 618 million gallons per day in 1995 to 872
million gallons per day by 2050)).
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rivers because of this explosive growth.121 Rural Georgia also consumes a
significant amount of water both for consumption and irrigation purposes,
placing additional pressure on already strained resources. 122
Similar to the states along the Missouri River Basin, the ACF River
Basin cannot accommodate all the demands; preference for one area is to
the detriment of another.123  Also like the Missouri River Basin,
competing interests for water allocation are not easily resolved and often
result in litigation.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The D.C. Court of Appeals began its analysis by first determining
whether Alabama and Florida have standing.124 The Court noted that the
states credibly claimed the fear of increased reallocation of water would
result in "diminishe[d] flow of water reaching the downstream states."l 25
Further, the states showed imminence of injury-in-fact, causation, and the
fact that revocation of the Agreement would provide redress for their
injuries. 126
The Court then focused its attention on the argument that the
Agreement's reallocation of storage space in Lake Lanier constituted a
major operational change under the WSA and required Congressional
approval.127 The WSA addresses the development of "water supplies for
domestic, municipal, industrial, and other purposes." It authorizes storage
for those uses "in any reservoir project surveyed, planned, constructed or
to be planned . . . by the Corps of Engineers or the Bureau of
Reclamation" so long as construction costs are shared by the
121 Id; see also American Rivers' 10 Most Endangered Rivers for 1999, PADDLER
MAG., July-Aug. 1999, available at
http//www.paddlermagazine.com/issues/1999 4/EcoRiver.htm ("Atlanta, the most
sprawling city in the country, is growing so fast it threatens the health of nearby water-
sources. The city's rate of land consumption is eight times greater than its population
growth.")
Klein, supra note 11 1,at 1054.
123 id
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beneficiaries.1 28 Additionally, the WSA provides "[miodifications of a
reservoir project heretofore authorized, surveyed, planned or constructed .
. . which would seriously affect the purposes for which the project was
authorized, surveyed, planned, or constructed, or which would involve
major structural or operational changes shall be made only upon the
approval of Congress as now provided by law." 29
Based upon a plain reading of the statute, the D.C. District Court
concluded the Corps' authority to alter a project's operations is limited to
non-major mattersl30 and that the reallocation of approximately twenty-
two percent of Lake Lanier's storage space constituted a major operational
change considered by the WSA.13' The Court then reinforced its position
by rejecting each of the Appellee's arguments in turn.
Southeastern first argued the Agreement maintained the current
status quo of water reallocation and therefore did not constitute a major
operational change.132 The Court rejected this argument by noting the
appropriate baseline for measuring the effect of the Agreement's
reallocation of storage space is zero, or the amount allocated for storage at
the beginning of the project. 133 The Court noted if it were to adopt this
logic, the rule would be moot as no major operational change would ever
occur as long as the Corps continued to make gradual modifications to the
reallocation limits. 134
Second, Southeastern argued the amount of storage space
reallocated by the Agreement was not enough in itself to constitute a
major operational change.135 The Court rejected this argument stating
Southeastern failed to provide any data indicating why a reallocation of
this magnitude would not constitute a major operational change.136 The
Court noted that although the Agreement provided hydropower generators
compensation for the full financial benefit they would have received from
1281d at 1321 (citing 43 U.S.C. §§ 301(a)-(b) (2000)).
129 Id at 1321-22 (citing 43 U.S.C. §§ 390b(d), 390b(d) (2000)).
130 Id. at 1323.
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Lake Lanier in the absence of reallocation, the compensation did not
prevent the occurrence of a major operational change due to reduced water
flow.137
Finally, Southeastern argued that because the terms of the
Agreement were temporary, Congressional approval was unnecessary.' 3 8
Again, the Court rejected this, stating it was unreasonable to believe
Congress intended to limit the Corps' authority to non-major changes. Yet
a loophole was left allowing for major modification so long as such
changes were temporary.' 39
The Appellate Court concluded that the Agreement's reallocation
of Lake Lanier's storage space to local consumption was a major
operational change under the WSA and therefore required Congressional
approval.140 Because the Corps did not obtain Congressional approval for
the reallocation of Lake Lanier storage space, the District Court erred in
approving the Agreement.141
V. COMMENT
Unsurprisingly, Alabama and Florida intervened and opposed
approval of the Agreement-until that point, negotiations had focused on
the allocation of consumable water to the state of Georgia and had failed
to protect either Alabama or Florida's interests. Debate is unlikely to end
soon since the parties missed their first and second renegotiation deadlines
of February 15, 2008 and March 1, 2008, respectively. The states are
currently subject to plans implemented by the Corps and other federal
agencies.142 Although debates over the allocation of water in the ACF
Basin are new in companson to other water apportionment cases, thirteen
years of litigation provide a significant amount of insight for the states of
137 id.
138 Id. at 1324.
13 1d. at 1324-25.
140id
141 id
142 Stacy Shelton, Georgia's Water Crisis: 'Big loser.. is metro Atlanta', THE ATLANTA
JOURNAL CONSTITUTION, Feb. 6, 2008 at 18A; Ben Evans, Feds say Water Negotiations
have Failed, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 1, 2008 available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-03-01-2626509258_x.htm.
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the Missouri River Basin. By reviewing failed attempts at negotiation, and
the potential consequences of an equitable apportionment suit, the
Missouri River Basin states have the opportunity to observe how similarly
situated parties - with a limited amount of water and competing interests -
can reach an agreement or fear being subject to court mandate.
A. The Potential for Court Mandate
In Southeastern, the court considered approving the Agreement
reached between Georgia, the Corps, the Providers, and Southeastern that
mandated a ten- to twenty-year allocation of water from Lake Lanier to
Georgia for local use. 14 3 While at first glance a permanent allocation may
seem appealing, often the drawbacks from a judicial mandate outweigh the
benefits. First, judicial remedies are often limited by judicial resources,
the court's inability to interpret complex facts, and the limits inherent in
the adversary process.'" These limits may result in a mandate that neither
fits the needs of the interested parties nor accommodates the potential for
an inadequate allocation of water necessary to satisfy future needs.14 5 In
New Jersey v. New York, the United States Supreme Court suggested the
doctrine of equitable apportionment is based in fairness, where every
abutting state should share fairly in the water distribution as every other
abutting state.146 The rigidity of a potential twenty-year agreement does
not bode well for Georgia whose population is expected to double by
2030, with six to eight million individuals who are part of this increase in
the Atlanta metropolitan area. 147 Currently, Georgia has approximately
90% of the Basin's population and 82% of the withdrawals of surface
water.148 An equal allocation between the three states would surely cause
shortages in Atlanta and other areas of Georgia. Alabama, on the other
hand, has 7% population and 11% of the withdrawals. Florida has only
143 Se. Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v. Geren, 514 F.3d 1316, 1319-20 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
144 Barlow Burke, Commentary, Association ofAmerican Law Schools Conference:
Transcript of the Section on Natural Resources in Atlanta, Georgia, January 5, 2004, 21
GA. ST. U.L. REv. 245, 292 (2004).145Id. at 293.
146Id. at 294 (citing New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 347 (1931)).
147 Burke, supra note 144, at 250.
1481Id. at 274.
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3% of the Basin's population and 7% of the withdrawals.1 49 It is quite
clear that some parties have more to lose than others.
The Missouri and ACF River Basins are similar in that they both
focus on navigation and flood-control with recreational purposes gaining
interest.1so Further, there are a number of interested parties in the basin, all
with conflicting views about the 'proper' water allocation. The Missouri
River Basin is currently managed by the Corps under the direction of the
Master Manual, while operating plans stem from the FCA.'5 1 The term
"multiple use" is often used to describe the management system, which is
generally defined as "a combination of balance and diverse resources uses
that takes into account the long-term needs of future generations for
renewable and nonrenewable resources."' 52 In application, multiple use
systems incorporate the difficult task of balancing among the many
competing interests for which land can be used.' 3  In reality, most
management systems stem from litigation brought by plaintiffs motivated
by deficiencies in the system. This results in a reactionary, ad hoc method
for managing water allocation.154 While a more concrete plan may lead to
more consistent management, the recent developments in the ACF River
Basin advise against judicial mandate. It is important for parties to
understand that filing a reactionary suit in response to a current allocation
problem may not result in a more desirable situation. As previously stated,
equitable apportionment doctrines often result in mandates that fail to
address the needs of all involved and prove inflexible over time. Further,
litigation is time-consuming, expensive for taxpayers, binding, and
typically leaves all parties dissatisfied. Members of the Missouri River
Basin would be better suited by attempting to reach a distribution
agreement between the upper and lower basins, rather than relying on
revisions of the Master Manual or litigation.
Learning from the mistakes of the ACF River Basin, states of the
Missouri River Basin must understand the significance of bringing all
149 id.
1so Garrison, supra note 65, at 67-68.
151 Sandra Zellmer, A New Corps ofDiscovery for Missouri River Management, 83 NEB.
L. REv. 305, 335-36 (2004).
152 Id at 340 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2000)).
153 Id. at 340.
154 Id. at 336.
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interested parties to the table. Because Florida and Alabama were not
parties to the initial negotiations, their interests were not properly
represented and their eventual intervention stalled negotiation efforts
between Georgia, the Corps, Southeastern, and the Providers. Members of
the Missouri River Basin would likely find themselves in the same
situation since it is unlikely an agreement that alienated certain parties
would receive Congressional approval. If the states of the Missouri River
Basin are to ever reach an agreement, they must note the points of
contention in past negotiation efforts both in the Missouri River Basin and
the ACF Basin.
B. Agreement between the Parties
Rather than face a mandate that fails to protect their distinct
interests, members of both the ACF and Missouri River Basins would
benefit greatly by reaching an agreement on their own. First,
renegotiations require a degree of awareness about the problems imbedded
in the original compact. Two difficulties preventing an agreement are
conflicting methods for determining current and future needs and the
incompatibility of the uses at opposite ends of the basin.'" If states in
either the ACF or Missouri River Basin form a compact, it should include
provisions for the formation of a commission with authority to remedy
problems as they arise rather than follow a rigid formula for allocation.' 56
The problem of conflicting interests must be resolved between the parties,
often resulting in various compromises. However, the flexibility of a
commission's authority is "a means of avoiding the necessity for
overstating the need for water and also a means of avoiding wasteful or
inefficient allocations, thus insuring the commissions allocate water as
needed but not precipitously or in advance of foreseeable needs." 5 7
States in the Missouri River Basin have such diverse and complex
interests that possibly the only long-term solution is an adaptive
management system. Rather than focus on setting specific allocation
amounts, an adaptive management plan can provide a framework for
220
155 Burke, supra note 144, at 267.
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.. Id. at 291.
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making decisions in the face of environmental and scientific uncertainty.
It also gives the Corps the opportunity to consider all relevant factors
when making allocation decisions. 158 Forcing the parties to reach an
agreement on set allocation amounts will only result in states placing their
immediate interests over those for long-term benefit of the entire Missouri
River Basin.159 Allowing for flexibility is more likely to result in a long-
term agreement that has the ability to consider the interests of all parties.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ten states of the Missouri River Basin are in a constant state of
flux as the Corps currently manages water allocation on a short-term, year-
to-year basis. If the states are ever to reach an agreement that provides
stability for long-term planning, the agreement must retain a high degree
of flexibility in water allocation that allows the Corps discretion in
considering the immediate interests of states in both the upper and lower
Missouri River Basins. Reflecting on current decisions affecting the ACF
River Basin, constant litigation risks a binding, inflexible judicial mandate
that may not serve the parties' current or future interests. If an agreement
is to be reached in eit her basin, collaboration amongst all interested parties
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